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THE MODERN AGE OF INFORMED CONSENT 
Barbara L. Atwell * 
Several years ago, Katherine, who at the time was a twenty- 
year-old Ivy League undergraduate, responded to a n  advertise- 
ment for egg donors. A s  a full-time college student, her financial 
resources were limited, and the promised $7,500 fee enticed her to 
respond. Katherine consented to the procedure despite the discom- 
fort involved and the numerous hormone injections that were re- 
q ~ i r e d . ~  She successfully donated nine eggs. Katherine subse- 
quently graduated from college and is now married with a 
successful career. She recently gave birth to her first child. She 
has stated repeatedly over the years that she regrets having do- 
nated her eggs. Katherine wonders whether there are other chil- 
dren who are biologically related to her and to her newborn child. 
She is also concerned about the long-term health impact of the 
hormone injections that were part of the egg donation p r~cedure .~  
* Director, Health Law and Policy Program and Associate Professor of Law, Pace 
University School of Law; B.A., 1977, Smith College; J.D., 1983, Columbia University. I 
would like to thank Elizabeth Jobson and Ronald Long, Esq., for their generous editorial 
assistance. I am also indebted to my research assistants, Briana Fedele and Dr. Gail 
Wilder, for their invaluable help. 
1. Cf. Jessica Cohen, Grade A: The Market for a Yale Woman's Eggs, ATL. MONTHLY, 
Dec. 2002, a t  74 (citing an advertisement in the Yale Daily News "offer[ing] $25,000 for an 
egg from the right donorn). Typically, egg donors are paid $7,500. Sandra G. Boodman, Us- 
ing a n  Egg Donor and a Gestational Surrogate, Some Gay Men Are Becoming Dads--and 
Charting New Legal and Ethical Territory, WASH. POST, Jan. 18, 2005, at F1. 
2. See Egg Donation, Inc., Donor Info, http:flwww.eggdonor.com~?section=donor& 
page=process (last visited Nov. 16, 2005). "The medical procedures leading up to the actual 
aspiration begins with injections of Lupron to suppress your natural menstrual cycle. . . . 
[Subsequently], you will begin receiving daily injections of Gonal-f, Fertinex or Follistim to 
stimulate your ovaries." Id. When the eggs are sufficiently mature, a single injection of 
human chorionic gonadotropin is administered. Id. The final step is for the egg donor to 
undergo the actual egg retrieval procedure, which is performed under mild sedation. See 
id.; see also Cohen, supra note 1, a t  74 ("Donating an egg is neither simple nor painless."). 
3. Other forms of hormone manipulation like oral contraceptives and hormone re- 
placement therapy have been linked to a n  increased incidence of breast cancer. See Nat'l 
Cancer Inst., U.S. Nat'l Inst. of Health, Oral Contraceptives and Cancer Risk (Nov. 3, 
20031, http://www.cancer.gov/cancertopics/factsheeVrisWoral-contraceptives (last visited 
Nov. 16, 2005); Gina Kolata, Study Is Halted Over Rise Seen in Cancer Risk, N.Y. TIMES, 
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Among the many innovations for which the twentieth century 
will undoubtedly be remembered are its diverse medical ad- 
vances. Not only were cures or vaccines found for infectious dis- 
eases like polio but other medical advances made possible the ini- 
tial diagnosis and treatment of many previously untreatable 
 condition^.^ Although advances in medical technology have re- 
sulted in a better quality of life, they, like other scientific devel- 
opments, have also created challenges. Among these challenges is 
the medical and legal issue of informed consent. When the in- 
formed consent doctrine was in its infancy, medical care and 
medical treatments were far less complex and extensive than 
they are today. Now, young adults may seek elective state-of-the- 
art medical procedures that result in life-altering changes. As a 
result of their youth, these young adults may be consenting for 
the first time to these high-tech procedures. Thus, the concern 
arises as to  the capacity of young adults to understand the full 
impact of their decisions. 
Advanced medical technology alone might warrant that we re- 
visit the informed consent doctrine to determine whether it ade- 
quately conforms to today's needs. Compounding the challenge, 
though, is another phenomenon that has developed simultane- 
ously. The last century has witnessed a social phenomenon in 
which fully realized adulthood has been delayed, in large part be- 
cause of the increased number of years spent in post-secondary 
education. Advanced formal education has led to a delay in mar- 
riage, childrearing, and emotional and financial independen~e.~ 
In fact, mental health professionals now recognize a distinct post- 
adolescent stage of personal development known as transitional 
or emerging ad~lthood.~ Emerging adults are vulnerable to a so- 
July 9, 2002, at  A1 (stating the effects of hormone replacement therapy when used by 
post-menopausal women); cf. Lars Noah, Assisted Reproductive Technologies and the Pit- 
falls of Unregulated Biomedical Innovation, 55 FLA. L. REV. 603, 614-24 (2003) (discussing 
the safety concerns associated with the use of fertility drugs and the dearth of regulation 
related to fertility clinics). 
4. The development of penicillin and other antibiotics, for example, made possible 
the treatment of bacterial infections. 
5. See infra notes 82-83 and accompanying text. 
6 .  Emerging adults are generally defined a s  young adults between the ages of eight- 
een and thirty, although other age parameters are occasionally used. See infra note 69 and 
accompanying text. 
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ciety in which they are treated as though they are fully adult 
when, in fact, they are still in the process of becoming  adult^.^ 
This essay explores the informed consent ramifications of the 
confluence of these two phenomena: developments in medical 
technology and emerging adulthood. In particular, it explores 
consent to  medical treatments by emerging adults that are both 
elective and irreversible. In such cases, policy considerations dic- 
tate that additional safeguards be implemented to ensure that 
the consent given is truly informed. 
Part I1 of this essay provides an overview of the informed con- 
sent doctrine and outlines a variety of advancements in elective 
medical technology. Part 111 explores the concept of emerging 
adulthood. Part IV suggests that when emerging adults seek 
medical treatments that are elective, non-emergent, and irre- 
versible, the law should require deliberative consent, a process 
that mandates counseling by a patient advocate along with a 
waiting period. 
11. INFORMED CONSENT AND MODERN MEDICINE 
The doctrine of informed consent is well-rooted in American ju- 
risprudence.' It is a natural outgrowth of the common law tort of 
battery that prohibits intentional unauthorized bodily c ~ n t a c t . ~  
This right to freedom from unwanted contact includes the exami- 
nation and treatment by health care professionals as well as oth- 
ers. Thus, on a number of occasions, including the landmark case 
of Mohr v. Wil l iarn~,~~ courts have held that health care providers 
7. See discussion infka Part 111. 
8. CARL E. SCHNEIDER, THE PRACTICE OF AUTONOMY: PATIENTS, DOCTORS, AND 
MEDICAL DECISIONS 6 (1998); see George P. Smith, 11, The Vagaries of Informed Consent, 1 
IND.  HEALTH L. REV. 109,115-17 (2004). 
9. Kate Haas, Who Will Make Room for the Zntersexed?, 30 AM. J.L. & MED. 41, 61 
(2004); Danuta Mendelson, Historical Evolution and Modern Implications of Concepts o f  
Consent to, and Refusal of, Medical Treatment in the Law of  Trespass, 17 J .  LEGAL MED. 1, 
29-35 (1996); Lars Noah, Informed Consent and the Elusive Dichotomy Between Standard 
and Experimental Therapy, 28 AM. J.L. & MED. 361, 364 (2002) ("Informed consent doc- 
trine emerged from the intentional tort of  battery. In order to avoid the risk o f  liability for 
unlawfully intruding into someone's personal space, a healthcare professional would have 
to secure his or her patient's consent before performing a surgical or other therapeutic in- 
tervention."). 
10. 104 N.W. 12 (Minn. 1905). In Mohr, the patient consented to surgery on the right 
ear, but the surgeon operated on the left ear. See id. at 13. This case was later remanded 
Heinonline - -  40 U. Rich. L. Rev. 593 2005-2006 
594 UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40:591 
may be liable for battery.'' As Judge Cardozo explained in 
Schloendorff v. Society of New York H ~ s p i t a l , ~ ~  "[elvery human be- 
ing of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what 
shall be done with his own body; and a surgeon who performs an 
operation without his patient's consent commits an assault, for 
which he is liable in damages."13 The logical outgrowth of common 
law battery, then, also provides the foundation for the principle of 
autonomy in medical decisionmaking. Today, autonomy is the 
fundamental principle underlying medical de~isionrnaking.~~ 
Competent adults exercise that autonomy by deciding whether or 
not to consent to medical treatment.15 This principle has become 
such a fundamental part of our legal fabric that individuals are 
for a new trial. Mohr v. Williams, 108 N.W. 818,819 (Minn. 1906). 
11. See Duncan v. Scottsdale Med. Imaging, Ltd., 70 P.3d 435,443 (Ariz. 2003); Chou- 
inard v. Marjani, 575 A.2d 238, 242 (Conn. 1990); Rachel L. Alpers, Note, Duncan v. 
Scottsdale Medical Imaging, Ltd.; Restoring a Patient's Right to Sue for Battery, 46 ARIZ. 
L. REV. 843, 843 (2004). But see Kohoutek v. Hafner, 383 N.W.2d 295, 298 (Minn. 1986) 
(holding that  trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to submit claim of battery 
to jury). 
12. 105 N.E. 92 (N.Y. 1914). 
13. Id. at 93. See generally RUTH R. FADEN & TOM L. BEAUCHAMP, A HISTORY AND 
THEORY OF INFORMED CONSENT, 235--73, 294 (1986) (providing a conceptual analysis of 
informed consent); Ken Marcus Gatter, Protecting Patient-Doctor Discourse: Informed Con- 
sent and  Deliberative Autonomy, 78 OR. L. REV. 941, 945-55 (1999) (tracing the history of 
informed consent); Paula Walter, The Doctrine of Informed Consent: To Inform or Not To 
Inform?, 71 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 543, 545-49 (1997) (outlining informed consent); Steven 
Horowitz, Note, The Doctrine of Informed Consent Applied to Psychotherapy, 72 GEO. L.J. 
1637,164041 (1984) (explaining informed consent in the context of psychotherapy). 
14. Gatter, supra note 13, a t  545-46. For patients who lack decisional capacity, courts 
generally adhere as  closely as  possible to the principle of autonomy by attempting to de- 
termine what the patient would choose if he or she were competent. This substituted judg- 
ment approach adheres as closely as  possible to the principle of autonomy by taking into 
account the incompetent's values and religious beliefs along with any prior statements 
that  reveal what his or her wishes would be. See, e.g., In  re Estate of Longeway, 549 
N.E.2d 292, 299 (Ill. 1989) (using substituted judgment to determine patient's wishes be- 
fore suffering from severe brain damage following a series of strokes.); In  re Eichner, 420 
N.E.2d 64, 72 (N.Y. 1981) (using pre-illness wishes as  consent for patient in a persistent 
vegetative state). Another principle in medical decisionmaking is beneficence. It  is gener- 
ally applied when the primary principle of autonomy is impossible to apply and there is no 
rational basis for determining what the patient would choose if he were competent. See, 
e.g., In re Storar, 420 N.E.2d 64, 72-73 (1981) (holding that was impossible to determine 
what a mentally retarded man with a mental age of eighteen months would have chosen). 
15. See Bouvia v. Superior Court, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297,30041,304 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986), 
Pub. Health Trust of Dade County v. Wons, 541 So. 2d 96,98 (Fla. 1989). Competency may 
be determined by examining (1) the patient's ability to evidence a choice, (2) the "reason- 
able" outcome of the choice, (3) whether the choice is based on "rationaln reasons, (4) the 
patient's ability to understand the choice, and (5) the patient's actual understanding of the 
choice. Loren H. Roth, Alen Meisel, & Charles W. Lidz, Tests of Competency to Consent to 
Treatment, 134 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 279,280 (1977). 
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permitted to refuse medical treatment even when the conse- 
quence of that refusal is death.16 
Today, the failure to obtain informed consent generally gives 
rise to a negligence claim rather than a battery cause of action.17 
Negligence as the basis of a complaint based on lack of informed 
consent more closely comports with the reality of medical prac- 
tice. Medicine, being as much an art  as it is a science,'' requires 
that doctors retain some judgment in determining appropriate 
treatments. Failure to exercise proper judgment in treatment de- 
cisions is rarely done intentionally.lg Therefore, medical malprac- 
tice claims typically are based on negligence." Similarly, doctors' 
informed consent practices require the exercise of judgment. Dis- 
closure may be excused, for example, if in the doctor's judgment 
the patient's emotional ability to handle the information is com- 
promised.'l Similarly, disclosure may be excused in an emer- 
16. In Cruzan u. Director, Missouri Department of Health, for example, the Supreme 
Court inferred that  a competent adult "has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in 
refusing unwanted medical treatment" including artificial nutrition and hydration. See 
497 U.S. 261, 278-79 (1990); see also In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 669-72 (N.J. 1976) 
(holding a father had permission to withdraw life-sustaining treatment from daughter); 
Wons, 541 So. 2d a t  97-98 (allowing a Jehovah's Witness to refuse life saving blood trans- 
fusion). But see Shorter v. Drury, 695 P.2d 116, 620-21 (Wash. 1986) (en banc) (holding 
that a hospital's release of a patient based on her refusal as a Jehovah's Witness to accept 
blood transfusion did not preclude suit based on negligent performance of operation). 
17. See Harrison v. United States, 284 F.3d 293,298 (1st Cir. 2002) ("To recover under 
a theory of informed consent . . . a patient must prove that the physician has a duty to dis- 
close certain information and that  a breach of that  duty caused the patient's injury."). 
18. See Velazquez v. Portadin, 751 A.2d 102, 107 (N.J. 2000); Barbara L. Atwell, 
Mainstreaming Complementary and  Alternative Medicine in the Face of Uncertainty, 72 
U.M.K.C. L. REV. 593,604 (2004). 
19. In extreme cases, for example, where surgery is performed on the wrong part of 
the body, a battery claim may still lie. See, e.g., Chouinard v. Ma rjani, 575 A.2d 238, 299- 
40 (Conn. App. Ct. 1990) (allowing battery claim when patient claimed that she consented 
only to surgery on her left breast and surgeon operated on both breasts); cf Rubino v. De 
Fretias, 638 F. Supp. 182, 185-86 (D. Ariz. 1986) (overturning statutes that would have 
precluded actions against physicians based on battery). 
20. See, e.g., Velazquez, 751 A.2d a t  10647 ;  Hall v. Hilbun, 466 So. 2d 856, 866 (Miss. 
1985); Helling v. Carey, 519 P.2d 981, 982 (Wash. 1974) (en banc). 
21. See Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 789 (D.C. Cir. 1972) ("It is recognized 
that patients occasionally become so ill or emotionally distraught on disclosure as to . . . 
complicate or hinder the treatment, or perhaps even pose psychological damage to the pa- 
tient."); see also Scott v. Bradford, 606 P.2d 554, 558 (Okla. 1979) (holding that withhold- 
ing disclosure is allowed if i t  would alarm a n  emotionally upset patient). See generally 
Margaret A. Somerville, Therapeutic Privilege: Variation on the Theme of Informed Con- 
sent, 12 L. MED. & HEALTH CARE, Feb. 1984, at 4,5; David E. Seidelson, Medical Malprac- 
tice Actions Based on Lack of Informed Consent in "Full-Disclosure" Jurisdictions: The En- 
igmatic Afirmative Defense, 29 DUQ. L. REV. 39 (1990) (discussing the proposition that  
non-disclosure to protect an emotionally frail patient should be eliminated). 
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g e n ~ y , ~ ~  or in cases where the patient is unconscious.23 Since the 
treating physician retains some flexibility in determining how 
much information to disclose, cases based on a failure to  obtain 
informed consent, like other medical malpractice claims, are 
based on negligence. 
The goal of informed consent is to obtain "a morally valid con- 
sent."24 Thus, each patient must be apprised of the nature of the 
treatment, along with any corresponding risksz5 In addition, the 
patient should be given information regarding alternatives to 
treatmenteZ6 Informed consent, then, is designed to protect pa- 
tients by ensuring that they have the material information with 
which to make an informed choice. 
In determining how much disclosure is required, some courts 
apply a reasonable physician or professional standard, while oth- 
ers apply a reasonable patient standard.27 Pursuant to the profes- 
sional standard, the question is whether the doctor has provided 
the same information that another reasonable doctor would pro- 
vide under the same or similar  circumstance^.^^ Typically, expert 
testimony is required to establish the contours of this standard. 
In the landmark case of Canterbury v. Spen~e,~ '  however, the 
court found that this professional standard failed to adequately 
protect the patient.30 Instead, the court in Canterbury reasoned 
that whether or not adequate information has been given to the 
22. See Jackovach v. Yocum, 237 N.W. 444,451 (Iowa 1931); Miller v. HCA, Inc., 118 
S.W.3d 758,768 (Tex. 2003). 
23. King v. Our Lady of the Lake Reg'l Med. Ctr., 623 So. 2d 139, 142 (La. Ct. App. 
1993). The patient may also waive the right to material information on his or her own ini- 
tiative. See Noah, supra note 9, a t  368. 
24. Smith, supra note 8, a t  112. 
25. See Canterbury, 464 F.2d a t  780; see also Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of 
Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990); Harrison v. United States, 284 F.3d 293,298 (1st Cir. 2002). 
26. Canterbury, 464 F.2d a t  782. 
27. See Noah, supra note 9, at  367 & nn.27-29 and accompanying text. 
28. See, e.g., Hondroulis v. Schuhmacher, 553 So. 2d 398, 405 (La. 1988); Walls v. 
Shreck, 658 N.W.2d 686,692 (Neb. 2003); Robinson v. Bleicher, 559 N.W.2d 473,478 (Neb. 
1997); Weber v. McCoy, 950 P.2d 548, 552 (Wyo. 1997). New York has codified the profes- 
sional standard. See N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW 2805-d(1) (defining "lack of informed consentn 
as "the failure of the person providing the professional treatment or diagnosis to disclose 
to the patient such alternatives thereto and the reasonably foreseeable risks and benefits 
involved as  a reasonable medical, dental or podiatric practitioner under similar circum- 
stances would have disclosed, in a manner permitting the patient to make a knowledge- 
able evaluation."). 
29. 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972). 
30. Id. a t  783-84. 
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patient must be determined from the viewpoint of the reasonable 
patient-not the viewpoint of the medical profe~sional.~' The 
court recognized that the "patient's right of self-decision shapes 
the boundaries of the duty to A "'risk is . . . material 
when a reasonable person, in what the physician knows or should 
know to be the patient's position, would be likely to attach signifi- 
cance to the risk or cluster of risks in deciding whether or not to 
forego the proposed therapy."'33 Today, jurisdictions are split on 
whether to use the reasonable patient or the professional stan- 
dard.34 
In practice, informed consent is far from perfect, regardless of 
whether the reasonable patient standard or the professional 
standard is used. First, the process is often inadequate. It may 
involve a brief conversation lasting no more than a few minutes 
with a health care professional, followed by the signing of consent 
forms.35 Second, a 1998 study suggests that physicians sometimes 
fail to discuss treatment options that are not covered by insur- 
a n ~ e . ~ ~  Thus, the patient may be unaware of potentially beneficial 
treatments simply because insurance is not available to  help pay 
for them. Third, the health care providers may be motivated as 
much by protecting themselves from litigation as they are by a 
desire to  provide information to patients. A patient claiming a 
lack of informed consent may be met in court with a signed form 
outlining the risks and alternatives of treatment, making the in- 
formed consent claim difficult to win.37 Finally, the doctor may be 
31. Id. a t  791. 
32. Id. a t  786. 
33. Id. a t  787. Some courts apply a subjective patient standard. See Noah, supra note 
9, a t  367-68. 
34. Noah, supra note 9, a t  367. From a bioethical perspective, the reasonable patient 
standard is much more compatible with the notion of patient autonomy than the profes- 
sional standard. What another doctor would disclose may have little relation to what a 
reasonable patient deems material. The reasonable patient standard adheres most closely 
to the goal of making sure that consent is truly informed when given. 
35. Cf. Jay  Katz, Informed Consent-Must It Remain a Fairy Tale?, 10 J. CONTEMP. 
HEALTH L. & POL'Y 6 9 , 8 1 4 4  (1994) (discussing the barriers to doctors and patients mak- 
ing joint medical decisions); J ay  Katz, Informed Consent-A Fairy Tale? Law's Vision, 39 
U. PIw. L. REV. 137, 160 (1977) (explaining that the courts' sole focus on disclosure, to the 
exclusion of consent, tends to perpetuate physicians' disengaged monologues and to dis- 
courage a meaningful dialogue between doctors and patients). 
36. Matthew K. Wynia et  al., Do Physicians Not Offer Useful Services Because of Cov- 
erage Restrictions? HEALTH AFFS. JulyIAug. 2003, a t  190, 191-94. 
37. The key to informed consent is the meaningful receipt of information rather than 
the signing of the form. In the hospital setting, some states presume valid consent when 
there is written documentation to that effect. The patient must then rebut that  presump- 
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motivated by his or her own interests, rather than by the inter- 
ests of the patient.38 In practice, then, the informed consent doc- 
trine, while laudable in theory, is not a panacea. 
In addition to the shortcomings discussed above, there are 
other challenges associated with the informed consent doctrine. 
The doctrine of informed consent dates back to a time when medi- 
cal practice was relatively rudimentary. Therefore, due to modern 
high-tech medical procedures, certain considerations that were 
not relevant when the doctrine was in its infancy are very rele- 
vant today. New medical treatments and procedures are being 
developed constantly. Thus, some treatments available today 
were unimaginable just a few years ago. Not only were medical 
treatments far simpler when the doctrine of informed consent de- 
veloped, but there were far fewer elective procedures. Patients 
went to doctors because they had to, not because they wanted to. 
By contrast, modern medicine includes a host of elective proce- 
dures, some of which are especially popular with young adults. 
Since the requisite age of informed consent is eighteen,39 emerg- 
ing adults are free to consent to any elective medical procedure. 
These procedures run the gamut from a wide variety of cosmetic 
surgeries, to an assortment of assisted reproduction techniques, 
to voluntary participation in human research experiments. A 
closer look at treatments popular with emerging adults is insight- 
ful. 
In 1997, 6,643 cycles of egg donation were reported.40 Egg do- 
nors generally must be between the ages of twenty-one and 
thirty-two, 41 although some fertility clinics accept donors from a 
younger range of ages.42 Thus, virtually all egg donors are emerg- 
tion. See FLA. STAT. ANN. 8 766.103(4) (West 2005); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. 8 7.70.060 
(West 1992). 
38. Cf: Deborah Sontag, Abuses Endangered Veterans In Cancer Drug Experiments, 
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 2005 (stating veteran cancer patients were informed that they were 
suitable candidates for experimental drug study when, in fact, they were not); see also in- 
fra notes 52-61 and accompanying text. 
39. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 899 (1992); Cal. Med. Ass'n 
v. Lackner, 177 Cal. Rptr. 188, 190 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981); People v. Enea, 665 P.2d 1026, 
1028 (Colo. 1983); In re L.D.F., 820 A.2d 714,716 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003). 
40. See Owen K. Davis, The Medical Aspects of Egg Donation, RESOLVE; The Na- 
tional Infertility Association, at http://www.resolve.org/main/national/treatmen~optiond 
donor/egg.jsp?name=treatment&tag=options (last visited Nov. 16, 2005). A single egg do- 
nor can donate multiple eggs per egg donation cycle. See Donor Info, supra note 1. 
41. See Boodman, supra note 1. 
42. Fertility Futures International, Become an Egg Donor, at http://www.fertilityfu 
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ing adults, and they are often solicited in college or local newspa- 
p e r ~ . ~ ~  Other assisted reproductive technologies ("ART") have also 
become quite commonplace in recent years.44 Surrogate mothers, 
for example, also frequently fall within the emerging adult age 
range, although a wider age range is used for surrogates than for 
egg donors. Organizations generally accept surrogates up to the 
age of forty.45 The same is true of sperm donors.46 Regardless of 
the form of ART they employ, fertility clinics are subject to very 
little r e g ~ l a t i o n . ~ ~  The combination of a largely unregulated in- 
dustry and the involvement of emerging adults, who may be 
tempted by financial gain, is troubling. 
Cosmetic surgery is also quite popular with emerging adults. 
The total number of patients who seek some form of cosmetic sur- 
gery is staggering. In 2002, 6.6 million individuals sought some 
form of cosmetic surgery.48 For emerging adults, that number was 
approximately 1.6 million.49 The most popular form of cosmetic 
surgery for emerging adults was breast aug~nentation.~~ The most 
popular non-surgical procedure was micr~dermabrasion.~~ 
tures.com/donors/index.php (last visited Nov. 16, 2005) (requiring that egg donors be be- 
tween the ages of eighteen and twenty-six). Yet other clinics accept donors up  to the age of 
thirty-five. Davis, supra note 40. 
43. Boodman, supra note 1; see Cohen, supra note 1. 
44. ART also includes in vitro fertilization, sperm donation, and artificial insemina- 
tion, among other things. Noah, supra note 3, a t  608-12. 
45. See Canberra Fertility Centre, John James Memorial Hospital Ethics Committee 
Guidelines for Surrogacy (Jan. 2003), http://www.canberrafertilitycenter.com.adsurrogacy 
JJMemorial.htm (last visited Nov. 16, 2005); Reproductive Assistance Inc., Become a Sur- 
- 
rogate, ht tp : / /www.reproduct iveass i s tance inc .co~s .asp  (last visited Nov. 16, 
2005). 
46. See Fairfax Cryobank Donor Screening, http://www.fairfaxcryobank.com/donor 
screen.aspx? menu=48turn=on (last visited Nov. 16, 2005) ("All semen donor applicants 
must be 18 to 39 years of age."). 
47. See Noah, supra note 3, at 614-16. 
48. American Society of Plastic Surgeons, 6.6 Million Americans Get a Nip, Tuck, and 
Lift with Cosmetic Plastic Surgery in 2002, Apr. 15, 2003, http://www.plasticsurgery. 
org/news~room/press~releases/6-6-Million-Americans-t-A-Nip-Tuck-d-Lift.cfm (last 
visited Nov. 16, 2005). 
49. Id. The age breakdown by the American Society of Plastic Surgeons includes nine- 
teen to thirty-four year olds. See id. Therefore, there is not a n  identical overlap with the 
ages of emerging adults. Eighteen year olds are omitted from this group, while those over 
thirty are included. See id.  
50. See id. 
51. Dermabrasion is the "[m]echanical scraping of the top layers of skin using a high- 
speed rotary wheel. Softens sharp edges of surface irregularities, including acne and other 
scars and fine wrinkles, especially around the mouth." American Society of Plastic Sur- 
geons, Cosmetic Surgery Procedures at a Glance, http://www.plasticsurgery.org/public- 
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Cosmetic surgery is not risk free. In fact, in 2004 a report re- 
vealed that two patients died during cosmetic surgery.52 While 
death during cosmetic surgery is unusual, the death of these two 
patients who were seeking face lifts is a reminder that all surgi- 
cal procedures involve risks. Just two years earlier, the surgeon 
who performed one of the fatal surgeries "compared cosmetic sur- 
gery patients to  'the lady who gets her hair done and her nails 
done . . . . People are wanting to do it as a part of personal 
grooming."'53 The effort to  appease the public by analogizing sur- 
gery to  personal grooming is the kind of reassurance that, while 
not unanticipated, may lure patients to  the operating table, espe- 
cially emerging adults who are still transitioning to  adulthood.54 
One example of patient vulnerability on the part of emerging 
adults involves human e~perimentation.~~ Researchers have often 
been criticized for "exposing clinical trial participants to  serious 
risk in the face of adverse data, omitting important information 
from informed consent forms, and having financial conflicts of in- 
t e r e ~ t . " ~ ~  Perhaps the most famous case involving this kind of 
lapse was that of Jesse Gel~ inger .~~  Gelsinger suffered from par- 
education/procedures/CosmeticPlasticSurgery.cfm (last visited Nov. 16, 2005). Other forms 
of cosmetic surgery inciude breast enlargement or reduction, liposuction, rhinoplasty (nose 
jobs), botox injections, stomach stapling, adominoplasty (tummy tuck), breast lift, browlift, 
chemical peel, chin surgery, eyelid surgery, face lifts, facial implants and hair replace- 
ment. Id. 
52. Alex Kuczynski & Warren St. John, Why Did They Die In Cosmetic Surgery?, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 20,2004, a t  1. 
53. Id. 
54. In fact, even adolescents are undergoing cosmetic surgery in significant numbers. 
Laurel Franck, Plastic Surgery Not for Teens, THE BATTALION, http://www.thebatt. 
com/media/paper657/news/2003/02/26/0pinio~lastic.Surgery.Not.For.Teens-l4865.shtml 
(last visited Nov. 16,2005) ('While young adults age 18 or younger made up only 4 percent 
of all cosmetic surgery patients in 2001, that is still an astonishing 303,103 people."); see 
also Shari Roan, For Obese Teens, Surgery of Last Resort; Weight-loss Procedure is Risky, 
but Some Doctors Say it Saves Lives, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 25, 2004, at F1 (noting the increase 
in bariatric surgery, or stomach stapling, among teens despite serious surgical risks). The 
death rate from bariatric surgery is 0.5% to 1%. Id. 
55. See Noah, supra note 9, a t  361. Noah notes that "[hlistorically, sponsors of clinical 
trials recruited subjects . . . around college campuses." Id. 
56. Josephine Johnston & Francoise Baylis, Gene Therapy: Two Steps Forward, One 
Step Back, CANADIAN MED. ASS'N J., http://www.cmaj.ca/cgdcontent/fu1V170/l2/1785 (June 
8, 2004) (citing Letter from Denis E. Baker, Associate Commissioner for Regulatory Af- 
fairs, Food and Drug Administration, Center for Biologics Evaluation and Research, to 
James Wilson, Institute for Human Gene Therapy, (Feb. 8, 2000), http://www.fda. 
gov/foi/nooh/Wilson.htm) (last visited Nov. 16,2005); see also Kurt Eichenwald & Gina Ko- 
lata, Drug Trials Hide Conflicts for Doctors, N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 1999, a t  Al.  
57. See Sally Lehrman, The Gelsinger Story, GENE LETTER, http://www.genesage.com/ 
professionals/geneletter/05-01.-00/featuredgelsingerl.html (last visited Nov. 16, 2005). 
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tial ornithine transcarbamylase ("OTC") deficiency, a disorder 
that creates dangerously high levels of ammonia in the blood.58 
Just after turning eighteen, Jesse decided to participate in a 
clinical trial that he believed would help scientists learn more 
about how to cure the disease, though he did not expect to benefit 
personally from the treatment.59 In other words, the procedure 
was non-therapeutic for him. Nonetheless, he decided to  partici- 
pate.60 Doctors injected a normal OTC gene attached to a thera- 
peutic virus into Jesse's liver; within hours, his system began to  
shut down.61 Shortly thereafter, he died.62 
Information later emerged disclosing the fact that prior to  
Jesse's death two monkeys died after undergoing a similar gene 
therapy p r ~ c e d u r e . ~ ~  Moreover, there were allegations of earlier 
severe adverse reactions that should have resulted in the study 
being aborted.64 Later revelations by the National Institutes of 
Health ("NIH) indicated that more than 650 adverse reactions to 
gene therapy, including several deaths, had occurred throughout 
the country.65 Sometimes, even the doctors themselves are not 
aware of the risks associated with certain medical treatments. In 
the research arena, for example, it has been reported that it is 
difficult for anyone, whether a member of the general public or a 
skilled scientist, to learn details about the problems cropping up in 
gene therapy studies. Even a new National Institutes of Health 
("NIH) database on clinical trials . . . will include no information 
about adverse reactions to gene therapy treatments. Further, finan- 
cial alliances and conflicts-of-interest will not be included.66 
58. Id. 
59. See id. 
60. See id.  
61. Id. 
62. Id. 
63. Gene Therapy Business: The Tragic Case of Jesse Gelsinger, NEWS WEEKLY, Aug. 
12, 2000, www.newsweekly.com.au/articles/2000aug12bio.html (last visited Nov. 16, 
2005). 
64. See id. 
65. Id. 
66. Id. The article goes on to state: 
"We know that  informed consent doesn't work," says Arthur Caplan, who di- 
rects a large bioethics program a t  University of Pennsylvania. . . . Caplan 
says the privatisation [sic] of science, combined with patients' ardent desire 
for a cure, conspire to prevent meaningful protections for participants in all 
kinds of studies. Trade secrets, financial conflicts of interest and overloaded 
review committees obstruct informed consent by keeping news about ongoing 
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Given the realities of modern medicine and the shortcomings of 
informed consent, it may be advisable to completely revamp the 
doctrine of informed consent. For example, different categories of 
informed consent could be created for different kinds of medical 
 treatment^.^^ One process could apply in emergency situations, 
while another procedure might work best with routine, non- 
emergency treatments. Perhaps the law should be most demand- 
ing of informed consent with elective procedures since the patient 
could elect to forego treatment. The shortcomings of an imperfect 
system of informed consent are compounded when vulnerable, 
young, emerging adults consent to treatments that are elective 
and i r re~ers ib le .~~  Such cases are the focus of the remainder of 
this discussion. 
A recent body of social science literature has identified a sepa- 
rate phase of personal development that takes place approxi- 
mately between the ages of eighteen and thirty6' known as 
emerging adulthood.70 Surveys suggest that individuals in this 
studies beyond the reach of patients and researchers alike. 
Id. 
67. Cf: Peter H. Schuck, Rethinking Informed Consent, 103 YALE L.J. 899,906 (1994) 
(arguing that informed consent must be contextualized). 
68. For medically necessary treatments, emerging adults would continue to be treated 
as  other competent adults. See In  re Quackenbush, 383 A.2d 785 (N.J. 1978) (explaining 
that patient may have capacity for some purposes but not others). Traditional informed 
consent procedures may continue to be used for medically necessary procedures, while the 
enhanced, deliberative consent procedures described below would be implemented for elec- 
tive and irreversible procedures. 
69. E.g., The Network on Transition to Adulthood, Between Adolescence and  Adult- 
hood: Expectations About the Timing of Adulthood, http://www.transad.pop.upenn.edu/ 
newdbetween.pdf (last visited Nov. 16, 2005) (studying young adults between the ages of 
eighteen and thirty) [hereinafter Between Adolescence]; Election 2004 and  Emerging 
Adults (1830 year olds), http://www.hs.ttu.edu/hdfs3390/fa1104project.htm (last visited 
Nov. 16,2005) (defining emerging adults as eighteen to thirty year olds). Others have used 
similar, though not identical age ranges. Cf: Jeffrey Jensen Arnett, Emerging Adulthood: 
A Theory of Development From the Late Teens Through the Twenties, 35 AM. PSYCHOL. 
469, 469 (2000) (stating that  the age of emerging adults extends from "the late teens 
through the twenties, with a focus on ages 18-25"); Jeffrey Jensen Arnett, Conceptions of 
the Transition to Adulthood Among Emerging Adults in American Ethnic Groups, NEW 
DIRECTIONS FOR CHILD AND ADOLESCENT DEV., Summer 2003 a t  63,64 (defining emerging 
adults as  aged eighteen to twenty-nine); David J. Hanson et  al., Rethinking Alcohol Use by 
the Emerging Adult, a t  http://www2.potsdam.edu/alcoholinfoNouthIssues/1046347764. 
html (last visited Nov. 16, 2005) (discussing the drinking habits of college-aged adults). 
70. The transition between adolescence and adulthood has been given a variety of la- 
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age group consider themselves neither adolescents nor fully 
adult.71 Social scientists agree that this interval is a time of tran- 
sition between the two. Emerging adults are engaged in a process 
of "change and exploration," and are still defining their identi- 
ties.72 
There are a number of characteristics, both internal and exter- 
nal, associated with emerging adults. Internal "characteristics 
that matter most to emerging adults . . . are . . . individualistic 
qualities o f c h a r a ~ t e r . ' ~ ~  Emerging adults, for example, find them- 
selves exploring what their own values and beliefs are as distin- 
guished from those that were imposed upon them by their par- 
e n t ~ . ~ ~  They consider full adulthood to be associated with those 
who have developed a concrete awareness of their values and be- 
l i e f ~ . ~ ~  In addition, the ability to make independent decisions, 
while limited in emerging adults, is a characteristic that is often 
associated with full ad~ l thood .~~  For example, emerging adults 
who are in college and still dependent on their parents have a 
more limited range of independent decisionmaking than their 
counterparts who are full-time participants in the work force. 
Another internal characteristic associated with emerging 
adults is the emerging ability to accept responsibility for one's 
bels, including: "early adulthood," Between Adolescence, supra note 69; "emerging adult- 
hood," A Theory of Development, supra note 69, at 469; and "adultescence," Annie Nakao, 
They Can (And Do) Go Home Again: Empty Nest Syndrome? Parents of "Boomerang" Chil- 
dren Should Be So Lucky, SAN FRANCISCO CHRON., May 30, 2004, a t  F1. Yet another re- 
search psychologist calls these young adults "thresholders" because they are on the 
threshold of adulthood. TERRI AFTER, MYTH OF MATURITY: WHAT TEENAGERS NEED FROM 
PARENTS TO BECOME ADULTS 24 (2001). Finally, this period of transition between adoles- 
cence and adulthood has been called the "quarterlife crisis." ALEXANDRA ROBBINS & ABBY 
WILNER, QUARTERLIFE CRISIS 5 (2001). 
71. E.g., A Theory of Development, supra note 69, at  471-72. Arnett argues that  the 
period between ages eighteen and twenty-five "is neither adolescence nor young adulthood 
but is theoretically and empirically distinct from them both." Id. a t  469. 
72. Id. a t  471. 
Emerging adulthood is a time of life when many different directions remain 
possible, when little about the future has been decided for certain, when the 
scope of independent exploration of life's possibilities is greater for most peo- 
ple than it will be a t  any other period of the life course. 
Id. a t  469. 
73. A Theory of Development, supra note 69, a t  472-73 (citation omitted) (emphasis in 
original). 
74. See Ethnic Groups, supra note 69, a t  70. 
75. See id. 
76. A Theory of Development, supra note 69, a t  472-73 (citations omitted). 
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self.77 This can include being considerate of others.78 It also in- 
cludes developing the ability to  minimize risk-taking beha~ior.~' 
Risk-taking behavior related to  drinking, drugs, and sexuality, for 
example, can be particularly challenging for the emerging adult. 
Emerging adults identify these internal factors, rather than ex- 
ternal societal markers, as the key to  a d ~ l t h o o d . ~ ~  
Nonetheless, a second set of external factors further describes 
emerging adults. For example, more individuals in this age range 
than ever before are continuing their ed~cation.~' Consequently, 
they are delaying marriage, entering into the workforce, parent- 
ing, and other behaviors typically associated with ad~lthood.~' 
Emerging adults are often still partially dependent on their par- 
ents, financially and em~tional ly .~~ 
Aside from some of the foregoing characteristics of emerging 
adults, both internal and external, emerging adults can be diffi- 
cult to define. For example, data suggests that most adolescents 
[age twelve to seventeen] still live at home with one or both par- 
e n t ~ . ~ ~  It also indicates that by the age of thirty, most people live 
independently outside their parents' home and are employed or 
participating in the work force.86 Between the ages of eighteen 
and thirty, however, during this stage of emerging adulthood, the 
77. Id. 
78. See Ethnic Groups, supra note 69, at 63. 
79. See id. 
80. See infra notes 89-98 and accompanying text. 
81. See Ethnic Groups, supra note 69, at 63. 
82. See A Theory of Development, supra note 69, at 471 ("The proportion o f  American 
emerging adult who enter higher education in  the year following high school is at i ts  high- 
est level ever, over 60%."). 
83. Only 32% o f  twenty-five to twenty-nine year olds, however, have completed four 
years of  college. Id. Instead, emerging adults are engaged in a wide range o f  exploratory 
behavior including education, work, and exploring romantic partners. I t  has been sug- 
gested that other cultures with different ideas of  adulthood may not experience the  phe- 
nomenon o f  emerging adults. See Larry J. Nelson, Rites of Passage in Emerging Adult- 
hood: Perspectives of Young Mormons, in EXPLORING CULTURAL CONCEPTIONS O F  THE 
TRANSITION '1'0 ADULTHOOD 33, 33 (Jeffrey Jensen Arnett & Nancy L. Galambos eds., 
2003). 
84. Cf: Jennifer Medino, Stay Local, or Go South? It's the Geography, Cupid, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 13,2005, at 14WC ("Moung adults living at home now make up more than 30 
percent of the 22 to 31-year-olds in the New York-North New Jersey area. Nationally, that 
figure is about 14 percent."); Lynda Richardson, Persuading Youth to Think Ahead (Way 
Ahead), N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 24, 2005, at B4 ("Almost 6 out of  10 college graduates are moving 
home to live with parents after graduating."). 
85. A Theory of Development, supra note 69, at 471. 
86. See id. 
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demographics are quite ~ar ied .~ '  It may be difficult, then, to find 
a way to balance independence, on one hand, with the need for 
clear rules and guidance, on the other. Acknowledging this chal- 
lenge, the Skidmore College website queries: "What is the right 
balance between nurturing and challenge, rights and responsi- 
bilities, individualism and community? . . . Respect for our stu- 
dents' emerging adulthood means that . . . we will on occasion in- 
tervene with other offices and programs on the student's behalf. 
,7 88 
. . . 
Challenges associated with alcohol consumption demonstrate 
the difficulty of striking the right balance between independence 
and rule-setting with emerging adults. As noted above, alcohol 
abuse, though not limited to emerging adults, is nonetheless a 
challenge with this age group. Legal recognition of the drinking 
problem prompted every state to raise its legal drinking age from 
eighteen to twenty-one.89 Therefore, a segment of younger emerg- 
ing adults cannot legally drink at all." As soon as this group 
turns twenty-one, though, they can legally drink without supervi- 
sion. Under-age drinking is relatively common and has led com- 
mentators to suggest that raising the drinking age to twenty-one 
has been largely ineffective." They suggest that the ability to 
drink, like the ability to drive in many states, be phased in so 
that emerging adults recognize drinking as an activity that can 
be a normal part of adult social life rather than something associ- 
ated with binge drinking and getting drunk:92 
Having a bird's eye view of collegiate drinking as  both keen observ- 
ers of drinking and its outcomes and long-term members of campus 
life, we would like to suggest an alternative to zero-tolerance: a sys- 
87. See id. ("[Tlhe years of emerging adulthood are characterized by a high degree of 
demographic diversity and instability. . . ."). 
88. Dean of Student Affairs, Skidmore College, Students as Emerging Adults, 
www.skidmore.edu/administration/dean-students/emerging-aduts.html (last visited Nov. 
16, 2005). 
89. See Ken Sternberg, Alcohol Consumer Must Be 21 Years Old in All States; Con- 
cerns Remain About Drunk Driving, 260 J .  AM. MED. ASS'N 2479, 2479 (1988). Access to 
federal funding was also a factor. A portion of federal highway funding can be withheld if 
a state reduces the drinking age below twenty-one. See 23 U.S.C. 5 158 (2000); South Da- 
kota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 212 (1987) (upholding the constitutionality of 23 U.S.C. 5 158). 
90. Cf: Margaret Raymond, Penumbral Crimes, 39 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1395, 1412-15 
(2002) (arguing that underage drinking laws are marred by a high degree of noncompli- 
ance and lack of enforcement). 
91. See, e.g., Hanson e t  al., supra note 69. 
92. See id. 
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tern of gradual access to alcoholic beverages by consumption-inclined 
19- and 20-year-olds. Why not teach responsible drinking behavior 
under mature supervision rather than leave these young adults to 
experiment on their own?95 
Thus, the authors suggest that emerging adults under the age 
of twenty-one be permitted to obtain provisional drinking li- 
censes .94 
Although the legal drinking age is twenty-one in every state, 
eighteen is the age of majority for most activities. Eighteen-year- 
olds can consent to many life-altering decisions, such as joining 
the military and getting married.95 Eighteen-year-olds can also 
vote and enter into  contract^.'^ Since society considers eighteen to 
be the age of majority for most acti~ities,'~ one might argue that 
eighteen-year-olds should also be able to give informed consent to 
medical treatments without further inquiry. On the other hand, 
by raising the legal drinking age to twenty-one, every state has 
set limits around an activity that is also not medically necessary 
and that has potentially harmful  repercussion^.^^ Thus, there is 
universal legal recognition that prior to  reaching the age of 
twenty-one, some activities should be restricted." The next sec- 
tion explores the parameters that would best serve emerging 
adults who are considering medical treatments that are neither 
medically necessary nor reversible. 
93. Id. The authors go on to  note that "[tlhe modern age-based prohibition seems to be 
working no better than the  1920s version; while a smaller percentage of  young adults are 
now drinking, a sizable minority is drinking recklessly." Id. 
94. Id. Certain restrictions would apply to provisional licenses. Id. For example, 
drinking after a certain hour may be prohibited. Id. In addition, formal instructions on 
responsible drinking would be required. Id. 
95. Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Youthful Indiscretions: Culture, Class, Status, and 
the Passage to Adulthood, 51  DEPAUL L. REV. 743,758 (2002). 
96. Id.; U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI, 5 1 (guaranteeing eighteen-year-olds the  right to 
vote). 
97. Woodhouse, supra note 95, at 758. The author notes the troubling exception in  the 
criminal context of treating children like adults, particularly poor children of color. Id. at 
757 (citing Barry C. Feld, The Juvenile Court Meets the Principle of Offense: Punishment, 
Treatment and the Difference it Makes, 68 B.U. L. REV. 821, 884 (1988)); see also supra 
note 39 and accompanying text (stating that individuals over the age o f  eighteen can le- 
gally consent to elective medical procedures). 
98. See supra note 89-97 and accompanying text. 
99. See supra notes 89-92 and accompanying text. Those who have studied emerging 
adults would arguably suggest that particular care must be paid to individuals up  to  the 
age o f  thirty. See A Theory of Development, supra note 69, at 473-74 (suggesting that peo- 
ple between ages eighteen and twenty-five are still struggling with evolving self- 
conceptions o f  love, work, and world views). 
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IV. DELIBERATIVE CONSENT 
We live in a society in which we have a confluence of two dis- 
tinct phenomena: advanced medical technology that now offers 
not only medically necessary treatments, but a whole host of elec- 
tive ones, and a distinct stage of personal development known as 
emerging adulthood. The informed consent implications need to 
be explored. 
If we begin by reviewing the goals of informed consent and the 
reasons why the doctrine was developed, it was clearly to  protect 
autonomy and meaningful choice. By being fully informed, pa- 
tients can make empowered and informed decisions. Informed 
consent was legally intended to partner the person with informa- 
tion so that his or her assent was based on full disclosure. Pa- 
tients would then be allowed to make educated choices and not be 
unduly persuaded to  consent to  medical treatments without ade- 
quate deliberation.loO 
The goals, then, behind the informed consent doctrine are 
laudable. Yet abuses may occur when material information is 
withheld. Moreover, third parties can manipulate the system 
when, for their own benefit, they withhold important facts from 
patients who believe they are getting complete information.lo1 If 
we revisit the example set forth at the outset of this piece, we can 
see the challenges faced by emerging adults like Katherine. When 
Katherine consented to the egg donation, she had limited finan- 
cial resources and had just discovered that she could earn $7,500 
for donating her eggs. This procedure was not medically neces- 
sary for her and was irreversible. Moreover, the procedure itself 
was not simple. It involved hormone injections and surgery to re- 
trieve the eggs.lo2 Should her consent to the procedure be valid? 
Clearly, informed consent concerns are heightened in a case 
like this, where there is a financial inducement. However, even if 
Katherine consented to  cosmetic surgery, a medical procedure 
with no financial gain, issues would remain about her maturity 
100. See supra notes 8-38 and accompanying text. 
101. See supra notes 55-67 and accompanying text regarding human experimentation. 
This manipulation of the system may also occur in the case of infertility clinics that  need 
donors and surrogates to survive, particularly since they are poorly regulated. See supra 
note 47 and accompanying text. 
102. See supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
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as an emerging adult, particularly given current concerns about 
whether the standard informed consent process adequately serves 
its original mission.lo3 We can examine the validity of the in- 
formed consent under both the standard informed consent para- 
digm, as it is typically implemented today, and a proposed delib- 
erative consent process. 
Standard informed consent in today's medical decisionmaking 
generally involves a brief discussion with the health care provider 
of the risks and alternatives of the proposed treatment or proce- 
dure, followed by the immediate signing of consent forms. A key 
concern of the health care provider is getting the form signed 
rather than confirming that the patient understands the material 
facts. As long as the informed consent form is signed, the doctor 
can defend against a claim that the patient lacked informed con- 
sent. In Katherine's case, then, the doctors would presumably ac- 
knowledge that there are minor risks associated with hormone in- 
jections and sedation, but would be likely to  reassure Katherine 
of the relative safety of the procedure. This brief explanation 
would be followed by the signing of the consent form. 
Deliberative consent would require additional procedural safe- 
guards to ensure that the emerging adult's decision has been 
properly considered. The first procedural safeguard would require 
the involvement of a patient advocate.lo4 The patient advocate 
and the emerging adult would be required to have a conversation 
about the specific medical procedure being considered. That con- 
versation should be at  least forty-five to  fifty minutes in duration, 
and the emerging adult should explicitly be given the opportunity 
to  ask questions about the treatment. Moreover, the conversation 
needs to explore the emerging adult's motivation for undergoing 
the procedure and to  examine whether he or she has considered 
the long-term ramifications thereof.'05 Second, following the con- 
103. See supra notes 24-26 and accompanying text. 
104. There are varying definitions of patient advocates. National Patient Safety Foun- 
dation, The Role of the Patient Aduocate: A Consumer Fact Sheet www.npsf.orgldownloadi 
PatientAdvocate.pdf (last visited Nov. 16, 2005). Patient advocacy is a relatively new field; 
see Sarah Lawrence College, Health Advocacy Program of Study, http://www.slc.edu/grad- 
healthadvocacy.php (describing masters program in health advocacy a t  Sarah Lawrence 
College.) (last visited Nov. 16, 2005). 
105. There is no indication that  this is effectively taking place right now. While repu- 
table offices may provide some mechanism for assessing the competency of the emerging 
adult, i t  offen appears to be for the purpose of protecting someone other than the emerging 
adult. At least one reporter concedes that "[elthicists wony that the practice of buying 
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versation with the patient advocate, the emerging adult must 
wait an additional forty-eight hours before final consent is given. 
This process would help ensure that the ultimate decision has 
been properly considered.lo6 
Deliberative consent, then, would include all the components of 
informed consent as it is currently structured and would add new 
procedural safeguards. The key to  determining whether a patient 
gave deliberative consent would not be whether the last step in 
the process-the signing of the consent form-was completed. In- 
stead, the focus would be on the process leading up to the signing 
of the form.lo7 In cases like Katherine's, a patient advocate would 
be able to ask questions that specifically address issues like how 
she thinks she might feel about the procedure in five to ten years, 
or how she will feel after having children of her own. Alterna- 
tively, she might simply ask what Katherine thinks may be the 
long-term implications of her decision. Simply asking the ques- 
tion may raise Katherine's awareness of nuances that she other- 
wise might not have considered. Emerging adults like Katherine 
have more limited life experience, based both on their youth and 
on limited exposure outside the educational setting. Their aware- 
ness of other options for achieving their goals may therefore be 
restricted. Katherine, for example, may have a host of other op- 
tions for obtaining $7,500. The patient advocate should ask, for 
example, whether Katherine has considered other sources that 
might be available to help her financially.lo8 Thus, the focus of de- 
liberative consent will be on full discussion and disclosure, includ- 
eggs and renting a uterus raises questions about informed consent." Boodman, supra note 
1, a t  F1. The author also notes that Creative Family Connections, a law firm based in 
suburban Washington, D.C., requires its donors and surrogates to "undergo medical and 
psychological evaluation." Id. It is not clear, though, that this evaluation is for the benefit 
of the donor or surrogate. It  is, perhaps, to protect the law firm from future claims that 
consent was not fully informed. 
106. While the legal age of consent for these medical procedures, like the legal drinking 
age, could be raised to twenty-one, there are too many other life altering decisions that can 
be made a t  the age of eighteen to justify a special exception for these procedures. More- 
over, that  would do nothing to address the special concerns of emerging adults between 
the ages of twenty-one and thirty. 
107. See CHARLES W. WIDE, INFORMED CONSENT: A STUDY OF DECISIONMAKING IN 
PSYCHIATRY 318, 326 (1985) (noting that informed consent forms are too complex, are of- 
ten not read, and are presented too late in the decisionmaking process). 
108. One might expect that a reputable fertility clinic would do this as  a matter of 
course. Fertility clinics, however, are subject to little state regulation and presumably run 
the gamut in terms of professionalism. See Noah, supra note 3, a t  614-16. 
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ing interaction with a patient advocate who has no personal stake 
in the patient's decision.log 
A two-pronged test can be used to determine when these 
heightened informed consent procedures should be implemented. 
First, the procedure must be one that is not medically necessary 
for the patient. Second, the procedure must be difficult or impos- 
sible to reverse. Procedures that might satisfy this two-pronged 
approach include egg donation, as mentioned above. It would also 
include sperm donation, surrogacy, breast implants, genetic tests, 
sterilization, many forms of cosmetic surgery, and perhaps even 
tattoos. Experimental treatments, particularly those that are 
non-therapeutic for the participant, would also be included. Live 
kidney and liver donations would be another, as would bone mar- 
row donations.l1° 
Some may suggest that since eighteen-year-olds can vote, 
marry, and join the armed services, among other things, they 
should also be free to consent to  medical treatments without en- 
hanced procedural protections. They may further argue that any 
modification of the informed consent process would be too pater- 
nalistic. Given the shortcomings of informed consent in its cur- 
rent incarnation, the better policy is to  provide greater protection 
to this vulnerable population of emerging adults. A deliberative 
consent approach arguably would be ideal in many instances of 
medical decisionmaking, not just those involving emerging 
adults. Anyone undergoing medical treatments should be well- 
educated about the process and its risks and alternatives. In ad- 
dition, a period of deliberation would be welcome. Other contexts 
for deliberative consent can be explored at another time. For now, 
an appropriate place to start, and a context in which deliberative 
109. Financially, the patient advocate must remain in a position of neutrality. Thus, 
either this person must be paid a flat salary or another mechanism that will promote im- 
partiality must be implemented. 
110. This is not intended to be a n  exhaustive list. The decision to have an abortion is 
explicitly excluded from this list. First, an abortion may be medically necessary and emer- 
gent in some situations. Second, acting in a timely fashion can be critical. Third, the right 
to abort is founded on well-recognized constitutional principles, the parameters of which 
have been explored intermittently for more than three decades by the Supreme Court of 
the United States. See, e.g., Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000); Planned Parenthood 
v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). The examples listed in 
the text have not been subjected to that kind of scrutiny. Finally, abortion is a n  emotion- 
ally charged, unique issue in  American society as well as  in American jurisprudence and 
should be considered separately. 
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consent should be required, is that involving emerging adults 
considering elective and irreversible medical treatments."' 
In this modern age of informed consent, an eighteen-year-old 
can undergo significant medical procedures that, while risky, are 
neither medically necessary nor reversible. Thousands of young 
emerging adults undergo elective, yet irreversible medical treat- 
ments each year. Given the continuing personal development of 
emerging adults and the failure of the traditional informed con- 
sent paradigm to fulfill its goals of patient protection, a new, de- 
liberative consent paradigm should be implemented. Deliberative 
consent would require counseling by a patient advocate and a 
waiting period for emerging adults undergoing certain elective 
medical procedures. This would better fulfill the goals behind the 
informed consent doctrine of educating patients and obtaining 
thoughtfully provided consent. 
111. Cf. Schuck, supra note 67, at 906 (arguing that informed consent should be con- 
textualized to the particular setting in which i t  is given). 
Heinonline - -  40 U. Rich. L. Rev. 611 2005-2006 
